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RECENT DECISIONS
tract expressly required the purchaser's personal satisfaction as to
the items to be included in the overhead. Further, there was no
waiver or other equity in favor of the seller. The court explains
that while overhead charges may not be dependent upon taste or
fancy, still experts often disagree as to what items should be included
in overhead, and since it is largely a matter of individual judgment,
such a contract requiring personal satisfaction should be strictly
construed.15
L. H. R.
CONTRACT-REPLEVIN-ENGAGEMENT TOKENs.-The plaintiff
and the defendant were engaged to be married. As a pledge for, or
token of, a mutual agreement to marry one another, plaintiff pre-
sented defendant with a diamond ring. Plaintiff alleges that he
intended the gift as an engagement ring and that it was so accepted
by the defendant. Thereafter, plaintiff and defendant by "mutual
consent" cancelled and abandoned their contract to marry. In an
action in replevin to recover possession of the ring, defendant moved
for judgment on the pleadings. Held, motion denied; the complaint
stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Wilson v. Riggs,
267 N. Y. 570, 196 N. E. 584 (1935).
It is well settled that when the donee breaks the engagement
without legal cause, the ring or other consideration must be returned,'
Union Telegraph Co., 268 N. Y. 108, 113, 196 N. E. 760 (1935), Loughran, J.,
says. "When literal construction is rejected in cases like this, the reason is
usually some consideration of hardship or unjust enrichment."
" In Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Holmes, 207 App. Div. 429,
438, 202 N. Y. Supp. 663, 672 (4th Dept. 1924), Sears, J., in remarking that
"overhead" is a word of vague content, says: "It may be said to include broadly
the continuous expenses of a business irrespective of the outlay on particular
contracts." Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., 276 Pa. 409,
415, 120 Atl. 409, 411 (1923) : "* * * there are many uncertain items fluctuating
between the administrative and operative ends, partaking somewhat of both."
In the instant case, Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 268 N. Y. 108, 112, 196 N. E. 760 (1935), the court says that
although strictly there is no element of taste or fancy involved, "the allocation
of administrative and overhead charges, to one of many separate undertakings
in a single business, is in large degree an affair of individual judgment,-an
interpretation which is not a matter of general agreement in the business
community." It is submitted that this explanation given by the court, may be
the basis for a contention that the instant case merely adds "overhead" to that
group of cases whose subject matter is considered as being dependent upon
personal taste, fancy or judgment.
'Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N. Y. Supp. 716 (lst Dept. 1933);
Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc. 277, 274 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1934) ; Humble v. Gay,
168 Cal. 516, 143 Pac. 778 (1914); Lumsden v. Arbaugh, 207 Mo. App. 561,
227 S. W. 868 (1921); cf. Rosenberg v. Lewis, 210 App. Div. 690, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 353 (1st Dept. 1924), where it was held that where gifts are made
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this condition being implied,2 and infancy is no defense.3  But the
donee may keep the ring if the donor refuses to carry out the promise
without legal justification or has by his fraud induced the donee's
promise.4 But when the parties mutually agree to break the engage-
ment, a different problem arises. A contract to marry may, like
other contracts, be abrogated by mutual consent, 5 in which case neither
party is at fault. The Roman Law provided for the return of
betrothal gifts when parties mutually dissolved the contract.6 In the
instant case the court found that since the engagement was cancelled
by mutual consent, the principle applied that the ring was given and
received upon the condition subsequent that it would be returned if the
parties did not wed without fault of either. In following this rule
the court is giving utterance to a public conscience, for essentially
the problem is one of ethics.
H. S.
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL CONTRACT TO BE
PERFORMED WITHIN A LIFETIME.-The plaintiff was the holder of
a note executed by the defendant's brother, one Arnold. The note,
when due, was not paid and plaintiff threatened suit, unless Arnold
procured a loan on his insurance policy in which defendant was
named as beneficiary. Defendant learning of the above facts, en-
tered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff, that if he would for-
bear to sue Arnold on the note, and would renew the note for one
year, the defendant would "in the event that Arnold die before the
maturity of the renewal note, pay the amount of the note to plaintiff
out of the proceeds of the aforementioned insurance policy." Arnold
died before the note matured and plaintiff now seeks to recover on
defendant's oral promise. The defendant interposes the Statute of
Frauds. Held, the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of
relying on the promise to marry, it cannot be said that they were given upon
condition that they would be returned if defendant refused to keep her promise.
2Sloin v. Lavine, - N. J. -, 168 Atl. 849 (1933); Williamson v. Johnson,
62 Vt. 378, 28 At. 27 (1890) ; Jacobs v. Davis, 2 K. 3. 532 (1917).
'Benedict v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189 N. Y. Supp. 104 (1st Dept.
1921), overruling Stromberg v. Rubenstein, 19 Misc. 647, 44 N. Y. Supp. 405
(lst Dept. 1891); Antaramain v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N. Y. Supp.
100 (1st Dept. 1922) ; Casling v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N. Y. Supp. 200
(1922).
SFross v. Hockstim, 72 Misc. 343, 130 N. Y. Supp. 315 (1st Dept. 1911)
Cohen v. Sellar, 1 K. B. 536 (1926).
'Grant v. Willey, 101 Mass. 356 (1869).
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